Stitching the Gadgets:
On the Ineffectiveness of Coarse-Grained Control-Flow Integrity Protection

Lucas Davi, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
Intel CRI-SC, TU Darmstadt, Germany

Daniel Lehmann
TU Darmstadt, Germany

Fabian Monrose
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA

Abstract
Return-oriented programming (ROP) offers a robust attack technique that has, not surprisingly, been extensively used to exploit bugs in modern software programs (e.g., web browsers and PDF readers). ROP attacks require no code injection, and have already been shown to be powerful enough to bypass fine-grained memory randomization (ASLR) defenses. To counter this ingenious attack strategy, several proposals for enforcement of (coarse-grained) control-flow integrity (CFI) have emerged. The key argument put forth by these works is that coarse-grained CFI policies are sufficient to prevent ROP attacks. As this reasoning has gained traction, ideas put forth in these proposals have even been incorporated into coarse-grained CFI defenses in widely adopted tools (e.g., Microsoft’s EMET framework).

In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive security analysis of various CFI solutions (covering kBouncer, ROPecker, CFI for COTS binaries, ROPGuard, and Microsoft EMET 4.1). A key contribution is in demonstrating that these techniques can be effectively undermined, even under weak adversarial assumptions. More specifically, we show that with bare minimum assumptions, turing-complete and real-world ROP attacks can still be launched even when the strictest of enforcement policies is in use. To do so, we introduce several new ROP attack primitives, and demonstrate the practicality of our approach by transforming existing real-world exploits into more stealthy attacks that bypass coarse-grained CFI defenses.

1 Introduction
Today, runtime attacks remain one of the most prevalent attack vectors against software programs. The continued success of these attacks can be attributed to the fact that large portions of software programs are implemented in type-unsafe languages (C, C++, or Objective-C) that do not enforce bounds checking on data inputs. Moreover, even type-safe languages (e.g., Java) rely on interpreters (e.g., the Java virtual machine) that are in turn implemented in type-unsafe languages.

Sadly, as modern compilers and applications become more and more complex, memory errors and vulnerabilities will likely continue to persist, with little end in sight [41]. The most prominent example of a memory error is the stack overflow vulnerability, where the adversary overflows a local buffer on the stack and overwrites a function’s return address [4]. While today’s defenses protect against this attack strategy (e.g., by using stack canaries [15]), other avenues for exploitation exists, including those that leverage heap [33], format string [21], or integer overflow [6] vulnerabilities.

Regardless of the attacker’s method of choice, exploiting a vulnerability and gaining control over an application’s control-flow is only the first step of a runtime attack. The second step is to launch malicious program actions. Traditionally, this has been realized by injecting malicious code into the application’s address space, and later executing the injected code. However, with the wide-spread enforcement of the non-executable memory principle (called data execution prevention in Windows) such attacks are more difficult to do today [28]. Unfortunately, the long-held assumption that only new injected code bared risks was shattered with the introduction of code reuse attacks, such as return-into-libc [30, 37] and return-oriented programming (ROP) [35]. As the name implies, code reuse attacks do not require any code injection and instead use code already resident in memory.

One of the most promising defense mechanisms against such runtime attacks is the enforcement of control-flow integrity (CFI) [1, 3]. The main idea of CFI is to derive an application’s control-flow graph (CFG) prior to execution, and then monitor its runtime behavior to ensure that the control-flow follows a legitimate path of the CFG. Any deviation from the CFG leads to a CFI exception and subsequent termination of the application.

Although CFI requires no source code of an application, it suffers from practical limitations that impede
its deployment in practice, including significant performance overhead of 21%, on average [3, Section 5.4], when function returns are validated based on a return address (shadow) stack. To date, several CFI frameworks have been proposed that tackle the practical shortcomings of the original CFI approach. ROPecker [13] and kBouncer [31], for example, leverage the branch history table of modern x86 processors to perform a CFI check on a short history of executed branches. More recently, Zhang and Sekar [46] demonstrate a new CFI binary instrumentation approach that can be applied to commercial off-the-shelf binaries.

However, the benefits of these state-of-the-art solutions come at the price of relaxing the original CFI policy. Abstractly speaking, coarse-grained CFI allows for CFG relaxations that contains dozens of more legal execution paths than would be allowed under the approach first suggested by Abadi et al. [3]. The most notable difference is that the coarse-grained CFI policy for return instructions only validates if the return address points to an instruction that follows after a call instruction. In contrast, Abadi et al. [3]’s policy for fine-grained CFI ensures that the return address points to the original caller of a function (based on a shadow stack). That is, a function return is only allowed to return to its original caller.

Surprisingly, even given these relaxed assumptions, all recent coarse-grained CFI solutions we are aware of claim that their relaxed policies are sufficient to thwart ROP attacks\textsuperscript{1}. In particular, they claim that the property of Turing-completeness is lost due to the fact that the code base which an adversary can exploit is significantly reduced. Yet, to date, no evidence substantiating these assertions has been given, raising questions with regards to the true effectiveness of these solutions.

**Contribution.** We revisit the assumption that coarse-grained CFI offers an effective defense against ROP. For this, we conduct a security analysis of the recently proposed CFI solutions including kBouncer [31], ROPecker [13], CFI for COTS binaries [46], ROPGuard [20], and Microsofts’ EMET tool [29]. In particular, we derived a combined CFI policy that takes for each indirect branch class (i.e., return, indirect jump, indirect call) and behavioral-based heuristics (e.g., the number of instruction executed between two indirect branches), the most restrictive setting among these policies. Afterwards, we use our combined CFI policy and a weak adversary having access to only a single — and common used system library — to realize a Turing-complete gadget set. The reduced code base mandated that we develop several new return-oriented programming attack gadgets to facilitate our attacks. To demonstrate the power of our attacks, we show how to harden existing real-world exploits against the Windows version of Adobe Reader [26] and mPlayer [10] so that they bypass coarse-grain CFI protections. We also demonstrate a proof-of-concept attack against a Linux-based system.

## 2 Background

### 2.1 Return-Oriented Programming

Return-oriented programming (ROP) belongs to the class of runtime attacks that require no code injection. The basic idea is to combine short code sequences already residing in the address space of an application (e.g., shared libraries and the executable itself) to perform malicious actions. Like any other runtime attack, it first exploits a vulnerability in the software running on the targeted system. Relevant vulnerabilities are memory errors (e.g., stack, heap, or integer overflows [33]) which can be discovered by reverse-engineering the target program. Once a vulnerability has been discovered, the adversary needs to exploit it by providing a malicious input to the program, the so-called ROP payload. The applicability of ROP has been shown on many platforms including x86 [35], SPARC [7], and ARM [27].

![Figure 1: Memory snapshot of a ROP Attack](image)

An example ROP payload and a typical memory layout for a ROP attack is shown in Figure 1. Basically, the ROP payload consists of a number of return addresses each pointing to a short code sequence. These sequences consist of a small number of assembler instructions (denoted in Figure 1 as \texttt{asm_ins}), and traditionally terminate in a return [35] instruction\textsuperscript{2}. The indirect branches are responsible for chaining and executing one ROP sequence after the other.

In addition to return addresses, the adversary writes several data-words in memory that are used by the invoked code sequences (usually via stack POP instructions as shown in ROP Sequence 2). At the beginning of the attack, the stack pointer (SP) points to the first return address of the payload. Once the first sequence has been executed, its final return instruction (RET) advances the stack pointer by one memory word, loads the next return address from the stack, and transfers the control-flow to the next code sequence.

The combination of the invoked ROP sequences induce the malicious operations. Typically, these sequences are identified within an (offline) static analy-
sis phase on the target program binary and its linked shared libraries. Furthermore, one or multiple ROP sequences can form a gadget, where a gadget accomplishes a specific task such as adding two values or storing a data word into memory. These gadgets typically form a Turing-complete language meaning that an adversary can perform arbitrary (malicious) computation.

A well-known defense against ROP is address space layout randomization (ASLR) which randomizes the base address of libraries and executables, thereby randomizing the start addresses of code sequences needed by the adversary in her ROP attack. However, ASLR is vulnerable to memory disclosure attacks, which reveal runtime addresses to the adversary. Memory disclosure can even be exploited to circumvent fine-grained ASLR schemes, where the location of each code block is randomized in memory by identifying ROP gadgets on-the-fly and generating a ROP payload at runtime [36].

2.2 Control-Flow Integrity

Although W2X, ASLR and other protection mechanisms have been widely adopted, their security benefits remain open to debate [1]. The main critique is the lack of a clear attack model and formal reasoning. To address this, Abadi et al. [3] proposed a new security property called control-flow integrity (CFI). A program maintains CFI if its path of execution adheres to a certain pre-defined control-flow graph (CFG). This CFG consists of basic blocks (BBLs) as nodes, where a BBL is a sequence of assembler instructions. Edges connect two nodes, whenever the program may legally transfer control-flow from one to the next BBL. A control-flow transfer may be either a direct or indirect branch instruction (e.g., call, jump, or return). To ensure that a program follows a valid path in the CFG, CFI inserts labels at the beginning of basic blocks. Whenever there is a control-flow transfer at runtime, CFI validates whether the indirect branch targets a BBL with a valid label.

An example for CFI enforcement is shown in Figure 2. It shows a program consisting of a main function that invokes directly the library function printf(), and indirectly the local subroutine function1(). The indirect call to function1() in BBL 2 is critical, since an adversary may load an arbitrary address into the register by means of a buffer overflow attack. However, the CFG states that this indirect call is only allowed to target function1(). Hence, at runtime, CFI validates whether the indirect call in BBL 2 is targeting label fn1. If an adversary aims to redirect the call to a code sequence residing in function2(), CFI will prevent this malicious control-flow, because label fn1 is not defined for function2(). Similarly, CFI protects the return instructions of printf() and function1(), which an adversary could both exploit by overwriting a return address on the stack. The specific CFI checks in Figure 2 validate if the returns address label ra1 or ra2, respectively.

It is also prudent to note that CFI has been studied in many domains. For instance, it has been used as an enabling technology for software fault isolation by Abadi et al. [2] and Yee et al. [43]. CFI enforcement has also been shown for hypervisors [42], commodity operating system kernels [16] and mobile devices [18]. In other communities, Zeng et al. [44] and Pewny and Holz [32], for example, have shown how to instrument a compiler to generate CFI-protected applications. Lastly, Budiu et al. [8] have explored architectural support to tackle the performance overheads of software-only based solutions.

2.3 Control-Flow Integrity Challenges

There are several factors that impede the deployment of control-flow integrity (CFI) in practice, including those related to control-flow graph (CFG) coverage, performance, robustness, and ease of deployment.

Before proceeding further, we note that besides presenting the design of CFI, Abadi et al. [3] also included a formal security proof for the soundness of their solution. A key observation noted in that work is that “despite attack steps, the program counter always follows the CFG.” [3, p. 4:34]. In other words, in Abadi et al. [3], every control-flow is permitted as long as the CFG allows it. Consequently, the quality of protection from control-flow attacks rests squarely on the level of CFG coverage. And that is exactly where recent CFI solutions have deviated (substantially) from the original work, primarily as a means to address performance issues.

Recall that in the original proposal, the CFG was obtained a priori using binary analysis techniques supported by a proprietary framework called Vulcan. Since the CFG is created ahead of time, it is not capable of capturing the dynamic nature of the call stack. That is, with only the CFG at hand, one can not enforce that functions return to their most recent call site, but only that they re-
turn to any of the possible call sites. This limitation is tackled by adding a shadow stack to the statically created CFG. Intuitively, upon each call, the return address is placed in a safe location in memory, so that an instrumented return is able to compare the return address on the stack with one on a shadow stack, and the program is terminated if a deviation is detected [3, 14, 18]. In this way, many control-flow transfers are prohibited, largely reducing the gadget space available for a return-oriented programming attack.

Given the power of CFI, it is surprising that it has not yet received widespread adoption. The reason lies in the fact that extracting the CFG is not as simple as it may appear. To see why, notice that (1) source code is not readily available (thereby limiting compiler-based approaches), (2) binaries typically lack the necessary debugging or relocation information, as was needed for example, in the Vulcan framework, and (3) the approach induces high performance overhead due to dynamic rewriting and runtime checks. Much of the academic research on CFI in the last few years has focused on techniques for tackling these drawbacks.

3 Categorizing Coarse-Grained Control-Flow Integrity Approaches

As noted above, a number of new control-flow integrity (CFI) solutions have been recently proposed to address the challenges of good runtime performance, high robustness and ease of deployment. The most prominent examples include kBouncer [31], ROPecker [13], CFI for COTS binaries [46], and ROPGuard [20]. To aide in better understanding the strengths and limitations of these proposals, we first provide a taxonomy of the various CFI policies embodied in these works. Later, to strengthen our own analyses, we also derive a combined CFI policy that takes into account the most restrictive CFI policy.

3.1 CFI Policies

Table 1 summarizes the five CFI policies we use throughout this paper to analyze the effectiveness of coarse-grained CFI solutions. Specifically, we distinguish between three types of policies, namely (1) policies used for indirect branch instructions, (2) general CFI heuristics that do not provide well-founded control-flow checks but instead try to capture general machine state patterns of ROP attacks and (3) a policy class that covers the time CFI checks are enforced.

We believe this categorization covers the most important aspects of CFI-based defenses suggested to date. In particular, they cover policies for each indirect branch the processor supports since all control-flow attacks (including ROP) require exploiting indirect branches. Second, heuristics are used by several coarse-grained CFI approaches (e.g., [20, 31]) to allow more relaxed CFI policies for indirect branches. Finally, the time-of-check policy is an important aspect, because it states at which execution state ROP attacks can be detected. We elaborate further on each of these categories below.

1 – Indirect Branches. Recall that the goal of CFI is to validate the control-flow path taken at indirect branches, i.e., at those control-flow instructions that take the target address from either a processor register or from a data memory area. The indirect branch instructions present on an Intel x86 platform are indirect calls, indirect jumps, and returns. Since CFI solutions apply different policies for each type of indirect branch, it is only natural that there are three CFI policies in this category, denoted as CFI_{CALL} (indirect function calls), CFI_{JMP} (indirect jumps), CFI_{RET} (function returns).

2 – Behavior-Based Heuristics (HEU). Apart from enforcing specific policies on indirect branch instructions, CFI solutions can also validate other program behavior to detect ROP attacks. One prominent example is the number of instructions executed between two consecutive indirect branches. The expectation is that the number of such instructions will be low (compared to ordinary execution) because ROP attacks invoke a chain of short code sequences each terminating in an indirect branch instruction.

3 – Time of CFI Check (TOC). Abadi et al. argued that a CFI validation routine should be invoked whenever the program issues an indirect branch instruction [3]. In practice, however, doing so induces significant performance overhead. For that reason, some of the more recent CFI approaches reduce the number of runtime checks, and only enforce CFI validation at critical program states, e.g., before a system or API call.

3.2 Instantiation in Recent Proposals

Next, we turn our attention to the specifics of how these policies are implemented in recent CFI mechanisms.

3.2.1 kBouncer

The approach of Pappas et al. [31], called kBouncer, deploys techniques that fall in each of the aforementioned categories. Under category 1, Pappas et al. [31] leverage the x86-model register set called last branch record (LBR). The LBR provides a register set that holds the

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Policy</th>
<th>x86 Example</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>CFI_{RET}</td>
<td>ret</td>
<td>returns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>CFI_{JMP}</td>
<td>jmp reg</td>
<td>mem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>CFI_{CALL}</td>
<td>call reg</td>
<td>mem</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CFI_{HEU}</td>
<td></td>
<td>heuristics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CFI_{TOC}</td>
<td></td>
<td>time of CFI check</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Our CFI policies
indirect jumps. Furthermore, ROPGuard’s only heuristic call-preceded instruction, the program is terminated. Specifically, it walks the stack to find return addresses. This would indicate that the function has been entered via a return instruction. ROPGuard also inspects the stack to predict future execution to identify ROP gadgets. Hence, it can detect ROP attacks that do not necessar-

With respect to its policy for returns, kBouncer identifies those LBR entries whose source address belong to a return instruction. For these entries, kBouncer checks whether the target address (i.e., the return address) points to a call-preceded instruction. A call-preceded instruction is any instruction in the address space of the application that follows a call instruction. Internally, kBouncer disassembles a few bytes before the target address and terminates the process if it fails to find a call instruction.

While kBouncer does not enforce any CFI check on indirect calls and jumps, Pappas et al. [31] propose behavioral-based heuristics (category 2) to mitigate ROP attacks. In particular, the number of instructions executed between consecutive indirect branches (i.e., “the sequence length”) is checked, and a limit is placed on the number of sequences that can be executed in a row.4 A key observation by Pappas et al. [31] is that even though pure ROP payloads can perform Turing-complete computation, in actual exploits they will ultimately need to interact with the operating system to perform a meaningful task. Hence, as a time-of-CFI check policy (category 3) kBouncer instruments and places hooks at the entry of a WinAPI function. Additionally, it writes a checkpoint after CFI validation to prohibit an adversary from simply jumping over the hook in userspace.

### 3.2.2 ROPGuard and Microsoft EMET

Similar to Pappas et al. [31], the approach suggested by Fratric [20] (called ROPGuard) performs CFI validation when a critical Windows function is called. However, its policies differ from that of Pappas et al. [31].

First, with respect to policies under category 1, upon entering a critical function, ROPGuard validates whether the return address of that critical function points to a call-preceded instruction. Hence, it prevents an adversary from using a ROP sequence terminating in a return instruction to invoke the critical Windows function. In addition, ROPGuard checks if the memory word before the return address is the start address of the critical function. This would indicate that the function has been entered via a return instruction. ROPGuard also inspects the stack and predicts future execution to identify ROP gadgets. Specifically, it walks the stack to find return addresses. If any of these return addresses points to a non-call-preceded instruction, the program is terminated.

Interestingly, there is no CFI policy for indirect calls or indirect jumps. Furthermore, ROPGuard’s only heuristic under category 2 is for validating that the stack pointer does not point to a memory location beyond the stack boundaries. While doing so prevents ROP payload execution on the heap, it does not prevent traditional stack-based ROP attacks; thus the adversary could easily reset the stack pointer before a critical function is called.

**Remarks:** ROPGuard and its implementation in Microsoft EMET [5] use similar CFI policies as in kBouncer. One difference is that kBouncer checks the indirect branches executed in the past, while ROPGuard only checks the current return address of the critical function, and for future execution of ROP gadgets. ROPGuard is vulnerable to ROP attacks that are capable of jumping over the CFI policy hooks, and cannot prevent ROP attacks that do not attempt to call any critical Windows function. To tackle the former problem (i.e., by-passing the policy hook), EMET adds some randomness in the length and structure of the policy hook instructions. Hence, the adversary has to guess the right offset to successfully deploy her attack. However, recent memory disclosure attacks show that such randomization approaches can be easily circumvented [36].

### 3.2.3 ROPecker

ROPecker is a linux-based approach suggested by Cheng et al. [13] that also leverages the last branch record register set to detect past execution of ROP gadgets. Moreover, it speculatively emulates the future program execution to detect ROP gadgets that will be invoked in the near future. To accomplish this, a static offline phase is required to generate a database of all possible ROP code sequences. To limit false positives, Cheng et al. [13] suggest that only code sequences that terminate after at most \( n \) instructions in an indirect branch should be recorded.

For its policies in category 1, ROPecker inspects each LBR entry to identify indirect branches that have redirected the control-flow to a ROP gadget. This decision is based on the gadget database that ROPecker derived in the static analysis phase. ROPecker also inspects the program stack to predict future execution of ROP gadgets. There is no direct policy check for indirect branches, but instead, possible gadgets are detected via a heuristic. More specifically, the robustness of its behavioral-based heuristic (category 2) completely hinges on the assumption that ROP code sequences will be short and that there will always be a chain of at least some threshold number of consecutive ROP sequences.

Lastly, its time of CFI check policy (category 3) is triggered whenever the program execution leaves a sliding window of two memory pages.

**Remarks:** Clearly, ROPecker performs more frequently CFI checks than both kBouncer and ROPGuard. Hence, it can detect ROP attacks that do not necessar-
ily invoke critical functions. However, as we shall show later, the fact that there is no policy for the target of indirect branches is a significant limitation.

3.2.4 CFI for COTS Binaries

Most closely related to the original CFI work by Abadi et al. [3] is the proposal of Zhang and Sekar [46] which suggest an approach for commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) binaries based on a static binary rewriting approach, but without requiring debug symbols or relocation information of the target application. In contrast to all the other approaches we are aware of, the CFI checks are directly incorporated into the application binary. To do so, the binary is disassembled using the Linux disassembler objdump. However, since that disassembler uses a simple linear sweep disassembly algorithm, Zhang and Sekar [46] suggest several error correction methods to ensure correct disassembly. Moreover, potential candidates of indirect control-flow target addresses are collected and recorded. These addresses comprise possible return addresses (i.e., call-preceded instructions), constant code pointers (including memory locations of pointers to external library calls), and computed code pointers (used for instance in switch-case statements). Afterwards, all indirect branch instructions are instrumented by means of a jump to a CFI validation routine.

Like the aforementioned works, the approach of Zhang and Sekar [46] checks whether a return or an indirect jump targets a call-preceded instruction. Furthermore, it also allows returns and indirect jumps to target any of the constant and computed code pointers, as well as exception handling addresses. Hence, the CFI policy for returns is not as strict as in kBouncer, where only call-preceded instructions are allowed. On the other hand, their approach deploys a CFI policy for indirect jumps, which is largely unmonitored in the other approaches. However, it does not deploy any behavioral-based heuristics (category 2).

Lastly, CFI validation (category 3) is performed whenever an indirect branch instruction is executed. Hence, it has the highest frequency of CFI validation invocation among all discussed CFI approaches.

Similar CFI policies are also enforced by CCFIR (compact CFI and randomization) [45]. In contrast to CFI for COTS binaries, all control-flow targets for indirect branches are collected and randomly allocated on a so-called springboard section. Indirect branches are only allowed to use control-flow targets contained in that springboard section. Specifically, CCFIR enforces that returns target a call-preceded instruction, and indirect calls and jumps target a previously collected function pointer. Although the randomization of control-flow targets in the springboard section adds an additional layer of security, it is not directly relevant for our analysis, since memory disclosure attacks can reveal the content of the entire springboard section [36]. The CFI policies enforced by CCFIR are in principle covered by CFI for COTS binaries. However, there is one noteworthy policy addition: CCFIR denies indirect calls and jumps to target pre-defined sensitive functions (e.g., VirtualProtect). We do not consider this policy for two reasons: first, this policy violates the default external library call dispatching mechanism in Linux systems. Any application linking to such a sensitive (external) function will use an indirect jump to invoke it. Second, as shown in detail by Göktaş et al. [22] there are sufficient direct calls to sensitive functions in Windows libraries which an adversary can exploit to legitimately transfer control to a sensitive function.

Remarks: The approach of Zhang and Sekar [46] is most similar to Abadi et al. [3]’s original proposal in that it enforces CFI policies each time an indirect branch is invoked. However, to achieve better performance and to support COTS binaries, it deploys less fine-grained CFI policies. Alas, its coarse-grain policies allow one to bypass the restrictions for indirect call instructions (CFI_{CALL}). The main problem is caused by the fact that the integrity of indirect call pointers is not validated. Instead, it is only enforced that an indirect call takes a pointer from a memory location that is expected to hold indirect call targets. A typical example is the Linux global offset table (GOT) which holds the target addresses for library calls. This leaves the solution vulnerable to so-called GOT-overwrite attacks [9] that overwrite pointers (in the GOT) to external library calls. We return to this vulnerability in §5. Moreover, even if one would ensure the integrity of these pointers, we are still allowed to use a valid code pointer defined in the external symbols. Hence, the adversary can invoke dangerous functions such as VirtualAlloc() and memcpy() that are frequently used in applications and libraries.

3.3 Deriving a Combined CFI Policy

In our analysis that follows, we endeavor to have the best possible protections offered by the aforementioned CFI mechanisms in place at the time of our evaluation. Therefore, our combined CFI policy (see Table 2) selects the most restrictive setting for each policy. Nevertheless, despite this combined CFI policy, we then show that one can still circumvent these coarse-grained CFI solutions, construct Turing-complete ROP attacks (under realistic assumptions) and launch real-world exploits.

At this point, we believe it is prudent to comment on the parameter choices in these prior works — and that adopted in Table 2. In particular, one might argue that the prerequisite thresholds could be adjusted to make ROP attacks more difficult. To that end, we note that Pappas et al. [31] performed an extensive analysis to arrive at the
We now explore whether or not it is possible to derive a Turing-Complete ROP gadget set even when all state-of-the-art defenses are ineffective in practice (see Section 5). We provide our own assessment in §5.3.

The approach of Cheng et al. [13], on the other hand, uses different thresholds for $s$ and $n$ than in kBouncer. Making the thresholds in ROPecker more conservative (e.g., reducing $s$ and increasing $n$) will lead to the same false positives problems as in kBouncer. Moreover, the problem would be worse, since ROPecker performs CFI validation more frequently than kBouncer. Nevertheless, we show that regardless of the specific choice of parameter chosen in the recommended ranges, our attacks render these defenses ineffective in practice (see Section 5).

### 4 Turing-Complete ROP Gadget Set

We now explore whether or not it is possible to derive a Turing-complete gadget set even when all state-of-the-art coarse-grained CFI protections are enforced. In particular, we desire a gadget set that still allows an adversary to undermine the combined CFI policy (see Table 2).

#### Assumptions.

To be as pragmatic as possible, we assume that the adversary can only leverage the presence of a single shared library to derive the gadget set. This is a very stringent requirement placed on ourselves since modern programs typically link to dozens of libraries.

Note also that we are not concerned with circumventing other runtime protection mechanisms such as ASLR or stack canaries. The reasons are twofold: first, coarse-grained CFI protection approaches do not rely on the presence of other defenses to mitigate against code reuse attacks. Second, in contrast to CFI, ASLR and protection mechanisms that defend against code pointer overwrites (e.g., stack canaries, bounds checkers, pointer encryption) do not offer a general defense, and moreover, are typically bypassed in practice. In particular, ASLR is vulnerable to memory disclosure attacks [36, 38]. That said, the attacks and return-oriented programming gadgets we present in the following can be also leveraged to mount memory disclosure attacks in the first stage.

#### Methodology and Outline.

Our analysis is performed primarily on Windows as it is the most widely deployed desktop operating system today. Specifically, we inspect `kernel32.dll` (on x86 Windows 7 SP1), a 848kb system library that exposes Windows API functions and is by default linked to nearly every major Windows process (e.g., Adobe Reader, IE, Firefox, MS Office). It

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$CFI_{RET}$ : destination has to be call-preceded</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$CFI_{RET}$ : destination can be taken from a code pointer</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$CFI_{JMP}$ : destination has to be call-preceded</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$CFI_{JMP}$ : destination can be taken from a code pointer</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$CFI_{CALL}$ : destination can be taken from an exported symbol</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$CFI_{CALL}$ : destination can be taken from a code pointer</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$CFI_{HEU}$ : allow only $s$ consecutive short sequences,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>s &lt;= 7</td>
<td>s &lt;= 10</td>
<td>s &lt;= 7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$CFI_{HEU}$ : where short is defined as $n$ instructions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>n &lt;= 20</td>
<td>n &lt;= 6</td>
<td>n &lt;= 20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$CFI_{TOC}$ : check at every indirect branch</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$CFI_{TOC}$ : check at critical API functions or system calls</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$CFI_{TOC}$ : check when leaving sliding code window</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Policy comparison of coarse-grained CFI solutions: ✓ indicates that the CFI policy is applied and enforced. ✗ means that the CFI policy is prohibited (corresponding execution flows would lead to an attack alarm). ○ indicates that the CFI policy is not applied/enforced. The combined policy takes the most restrictive setting for each CFI policy.

is also noteworthy to mention that our results do not only apply to Windows; Although we did not perform a Turing-complete gadget analysis for Linux’s default library (lib.so), to demonstrate the generality of our approach, we provide a shellcode exploit that uses gadgets from lib.so (see §5.2). To facilitate the gadget finding process, we developed a static analysis python module in IDA Pro that outputs all call-preceded sequences ending in an indirect branch. We also developed a sequence filter in the general purpose D programming language that allows us to check for sequences containing a specific register, instruction, or memory operand. Note that in the subsequent discussions, we use the Intel assembler syntax, e.g., mov destination, source and use a semicolon to separate two consecutive instructions.

We first review in §4.1 the basic gadgets that form a Turing-complete language [12, 35]. To achieve Turing-completeness, we require gadgets to realize memory load and store operations, as well as a gadget to realize a conditional branch. Afterwards, we present two new gadget types called the Call-Ret-Pair gadget (§4.2.1) and the Long-NOP gadget (§4.2.2). Constructing the latter was a non-trivial engineering task and the outcome played an important role in “stitching” gadgets together, thereby bypassing coarse-grained CFI defenses. It should also be noted that we only present a subset of the available sequences. Eliminating the specific few sequences presented here will not prevent our attack, since kernel32.dll (and many other libraries) provides a multitude of other sequences we could have leveraged.

4.1 Basic Gadget Arsenal

Loading Registers. Load gadgets are leveraged in nearly every ROP exploit to load a value from the stack into a CPU register. Recall that x86 provides six general registers (eax, ebx, ecx, edx, esi, edi), a base/frame pointer register (ebp), the stack pointer (esp), and the instruction pointer (eip). All registers can be directly accessed (read and write) by assembler instructions except the eip which is only indirectly influenced by dedicated branch instructions such as ret, call, and jmp.

Typically, stack loading is achieved on x86 via the POP instruction. The call-preceded load gadgets we identified in kernel32.dll are summarized in Table 3. Except for the ebp register, we are not able to load any other register without inducing a side-effect, i.e., without affecting other registers. That said, notice that the sequence for esi, edi, and ecx only modifies the base pointer (ebp). Because traditionally ebp holds the base pointer and no data, and ordinary programs can be compiled without using a base pointer, we consider ebp as an intermediate register in our gadget set. The astute reader would have noticed that the sequences for edi and ecx modify the stack pointer as well through the leave instruction, where leave behaves as mov esp, ebp; pop ebp. However, we can handle this side-effect, since the stack pointer receives the value from our intermediate register ebp. Hence, we first invoke the load gadget for ebp and load the desired stack pointer value, and afterwards call the sequence for edi/ecx.

More challenges arise when loading the general-purpose registers eax, ebx, and edx. While ebx can be loaded with side-effects, we were not able to find any useful stack pop sequence for eax and edx. This is not surprising given the fact that we must use call-preceded sequences. Typically, these sequences are found in function epilogues, where a function epilogue is responsible for resetting the caller-saved registers (esi, edi, ebp). We alleviate the side-effects for ebx by loading all the caller-saved registers from the stack.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Register</th>
<th>Call-Preceded Sequence (ending in ret)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EBP</td>
<td>pop ebp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESI</td>
<td>pop esi; pop ebp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDI</td>
<td>pop edi; leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECX</td>
<td>pop ecx; leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBX</td>
<td>pop edi; pop esi; pop ebx; pop ebp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAX</td>
<td>mov eax,edi; pop edi; leave</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDX</td>
<td>mov eax,[ebp-8]; mov edx,[ebp-4];</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>pop edi; leave</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Register Load Gadgets

For eax and edx, data movement gadgets can be used. As can be seen in Table 3, eax can be loaded using the edi load gadget in advance. The situation is more complicated for edx, especially given our choice to only use kernel32.dll. In particular, while there is a sequence that allows one to load edx by using the ebp load gadget beforehand, it is challenging to do so since the adversary would need to save the state of some registers. That said, other default Windows libraries (such as kernel32.dll) offer several more convenient gadgets to load edx (e.g., a common sequence we observed was pop edx; pop ecx; jmp eax), and so this limitation should not be a major obstacle in practice.

Loading and Storing from Memory. In general, software programs can only accomplish their tasks if the underlying processor architecture provides instructions for loading from memory and storing values to memory. Similarly, ROP attacks require memory load and store gadgets. Although we have found several load and store gadgets, we focus on the gadgets listed in Table 4.

In particular, we discovered load gadgets that use eax as the destination register. The specific load gadget shown in Table 4 loads a value from memory pointed to by ebp+8. Hence, the adversary is required to correctly set the target address of the memory load operation in ebp via the register load gadget shown in Table 3.
We also identified a corresponding memory store gadget on eax. The shown gadget stores eax at the address provided by register esi, which needs to be initialized by a load register gadget beforehand. The gadget has no side-effects, since it resets eax (which was stored earlier) and loads new values from the stack into esi (which held the target address) and ebp (our intermediate register).

Given a memory store gadget for eax and the fact that we have already identified register load gadgets for each register, it is sufficient to use the same memory load on eax to load any other register. This is possible because we use the eax load gadget to load the desired value from memory, store it afterwards on the stack, and finally use one of the register load gadgets to load the value into the desired register. Finally, we also identified some convenient memory store gadgets for esi and edi only requiring ebp to hold the target address of the store operation.

**Arithmetic and Logical Gadgets.** For arithmetic operations we utilize the sequence containing the x86 sub instruction shown in Table 5. This instruction takes the operands from eax and esi and stores the result of the subtraction into eax. Both operands can be loaded by using the register load gadgets (see Table 3). The same gadget can be used to perform an addition: one only needs to load the two’s complement into esi. Based on addition and subtraction, we can realize multiplication and division as well. Unfortunately, logical gadgets are not as commonplace. There is, however, a XOR gadget that takes its operands from eax and edi (see Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Call-Preceded Sequence (ending in ret)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADD/SUB</td>
<td>sub eax,esi; pop esi; pop ebp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>XOR</td>
<td>xor eax,edi; pop edi; pop esi; pop ebp</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5: Arithmetic and Logical Gadgets*

**Branching Gadgets.** We remind the reader that branching in ROP attacks is realized by modifying the stack pointer rather than the instruction pointer [35]. In general, we can distinguish two different types of branches: unconditional and conditional branches. kernel32.dll, for example, offers two variants for an unconditional branch gadget (see Table 6). The first uses the leave instruction to load the stack pointer (esp) with a new address that has been loaded before into our intermediate register ebp. The second variant realizes the unconditional branch by adding a constant offset to esp. Either one suffices for our purposes.

Conditional branch gadgets change the stack pointer iff a particular condition holds. Because load, store, and arithmetic/logic computation can be conveniently done for eax, we could place the conditional in this register. Unfortunately, because a direct load of esp (that depended on the value of eax) was not readily available, we realized the conditional branch in three steps requiring the invocation of only four ROP sequences. That said, our gadget is still within the constraints for the number of allowable consecutive sequences in the Combined CFI-enforcement Policy (see \( n = 8 \) for \( CF\_HEU \) in Table 2).

First, we use the conditional branch gadget (see Table 6) to either load 0 or a prepared value into eax. In this sequence neg eax computes the two’s complement and, more importantly, sets the carry flag to zero if and only if eax was zero beforehand. This is nicely used by the subsequent sbb instruction, which subtracts the register from itself, always yielding zero, but additionally subtracting an extra one if the carry flag is set. Because subtracting one from zero gives 0xFFFFFFFF, the next and masks either none or all the bits. Hence, the result in eax will be exactly the contents of \([ebp-4] \) if eax was zero, or zero otherwise. One might think that it is very unlikely to find sequences that follow the pattern neg-sbb-and. However, we found 16 sequences in kernel32.dll that follow the same pattern and could have been leveraged for a conditional branch gadget.

We then use the ADD/SUB gadget (see Table 5) to subtract esi from eax so that the latter holds the branch offset for esp. Finally, we move eax into esp using the stack as temporary storage. The STORE(eax) gadget (see Table 4) will store the branch offset on the stack, where pop ebp followed by the unconditional branch 1 gadget loads it into esp.

**4.2 Extended Gadget Set**

For those readers who have either written or analyzed real-world ROP exploits before, it would be clear to them that several other gadgets are useful in practice. For example, modern exploits usually invoke several WinAPI functions to perform malicious actions, e.g., launching
Table 7: Function Call Gadgets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Call-Preceded Sequence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Call 1</td>
<td>lea eax,[ebp-34h]; push eax; call esi; ret</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call 2</td>
<td>call eax</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call 3</td>
<td>push eax; call [ebp+OCh]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a malicious executable by invoking WinExec(). Calling such functions within a ROP attack requires a function call gadget (§4.2.1). It is also useful to have gadgets that allow one to conveniently write a NULL word to memory (the Null-Byte gadget) or the Stack-pivot gadget [17] which is used by attacks exploiting heap overflows. Our instantiations of the Null-Byte and Stack-pivot gadgets are given in the Appendix as they are not vital to understanding the discussion that follows.

Additionally, to provide a generic method for circumventing the behavioral heuristics of the Combined CFI Policy, we present a new gadget type, coined Long-NOP, containing long sequences of instructions which do not break the semantics of an arbitrary ROP chain (§4.2.2).

### 4.2.1 Call-Ret-Pair Gadget

CFI policies raise several challenges with respect to calling WinAPI functions within a ROP attack. First, one cannot simply exploit a ret instruction because the CFI policy states that only a call-preceded sequence is allowed — clearly, the beginning of a function is not call-preceded. Second, the adversary must regain control when the function returns. Hence, the return address of the function to be called must point to a call-preceded sequence that allows the ROP attack to continue.

To overcome these restrictions, we utilize what we coined a Call-Ret-Pair gadget. The basic idea is to use a sequence that terminates in an indirect call but provides a short instruction sequence afterwards that terminates in a ret instruction. Among our possible choices, the Call 1 sequence shown in Table 7 was selected.

To better understand the intricacies of this gadget, we provide an example in Figure 3. This example depicts how we can leverage our gadget to call VirtualAlloc(). We start with a load register gadget which first loads the start address of VirtualAlloc() into esi. Further, it loads into ebp an address denoted as ADDR. At this address is stored RET 3, the pointer to the ROP sequence we desire to call after VirtualAlloc() has returned. The next ROP sequence is our Call-Ret-Pair gadget, where the first instruction effectively loads RET 3 pointed to by ebp−34h into eax. Next, RET 3 is stored at ADDR onto the stack using a push instruction before the function call occurs. The push instruction also decrements the stack pointer so that it points to RET 2. The subsequent indirect call invokes VirtualAlloc() and automatically pushes the return address onto the stack, i.e., it will overwrite RET 2 with the return address. This ensures that the control-flow will be redirected to the ret instruction in our Call-Ret-Pair gadget when VirtualAlloc() returns. Lastly, the return will use RET 3 to invoke the next ROP sequence.

Note that this Call-Ret-Pair gadget works for subroutines following the stdcall calling convention. Such function remove their arguments from the stack upon function return. For functions using cdecl, we use a Call-Ret-Pair gadget that pops after the function call, the arguments of the subroutine from the stack. The details of the gadget we use for cdecl function can be found in the Appendix of our technical report [19].

For ROP attacks that terminate in a function call, we leverage the Call 2 and Call 3 gadgets in Table 7. The difference resides in the fact that Call 2 requires the target address to be loaded into eax, whereas Call 3 loads the branch address from memory.

Recall that the CFI policy for indirect calls (CFI_{CALL} in Table 2) only permits the use of branch addresses taken from an exported symbol or a valid code pointer place. However, as we already described in §3.2.4, the integrity of code pointers is not guaranteed. Hence, we can leverage GOT overwrite-like attacks to change the address at a given code pointer location. Alternatively, since modern applications typically make use of many WinAPI functions by default, we can indirectly call one of these functions using the external symbols.

### 4.2.2 Long-NOP Gadget

Our final gadget is needed to thwart the restriction that after \( s = 7 \) short sequences in a row is used, another sequence of at least \( n = 20 \) instructions must follow (see CFI_{HEU} in Table 2). For this task, we developed a new gadget type that we refer to as the long no-operation (long-NOP) gadget. Constructing long-NOP in a way that does not break the semantics of an arbitrary ROP chain was a non-trivial task that required painstaking analyses and a stroke of luck.

To identify possible sequences for this gadget type, we let our sequence finder filter those call-preceded sequences that contain more than \( n = 20 \) instructions. To ensure that the long sequence does not break the seman-
tics of the ROP chain, we further reduced the set of sequences to those that (i) contain many memory-write instructions, and (ii) make use of only a small set of registers. While the latter requirement is obvious, the former seems counter-intuitive as it can potentially change the memory state of the process. However, if we are able to control the destination address of these memory writes, we can write arbitrary values into the data area of the process outside the memory used by our ROP attack.

In each round, we use the same address for issue 13 memory writes in a small window of 36 bytes. However, the content of register $esi$ is used to set three registers: $esi$, $edi$, and $ebp$. We load in $esi$ and $edi$ the same address, namely DATA_ADDR, which points to an arbitrary data memory area in the address space of the application, e.g., stack, heap, or any other data segment of an executable module. Due to the ret 8 instruction, the stack pointer will be incremented by 8 more bytes leaving space for pattern values. Afterwards, our long-NOP sequence uses $esi$ and $edi$ to issue 13 memory writes in a small window of 36 bytes. In each round, we use the same address for DATA_ADDR, and hence, we always write the same arbitrary values in a 36 byte memory space not affecting memory used by our ROP attack. The long-NOP sequence also destroys the value of $eax$ and loads new values via pop instructions in other registers. However, these register changes are resolved by our optional sequences discussed next.

**Optional Sequences.** ROP Sequence 2 to 6 are the optional sequences, and are responsible for preserving the state of all registers. The optional sequences shown in Figure 4 represent those already presented in our basic gadget arsenal in §4.1. Depending on the specific goals and gadgets of a ROP attack, the adversary can choose among the optional sequences as required.

ROP Sequence 2 and 3 store the value of $esi$ on the stack in such a way that the pop $esi$ instruction in long-NOP resets the value accordingly. ROP Sequence 4 to 6 store the content of $eax$ and $edi$ on the stack. Similar to the store for $esi$, the content is again re-loaded into these registers via pop instructions at the end of the long-NOP sequence. However, the content of register $eax$ and $ebx$ is exchanged after the long-NOP sequence since mov $eax$, $ebx$ stores $ebx$ to $eax$, and the former value of $eax$ is loaded via pop into $ebx$. However, we can compensate this switch by invoking the Long-NOP gadget twice so that $eax$ and $ebx$ are exchanged again.

### 5 Hardening Real-World Exploits

We now elaborate on the hardening of two real-world exploits against 32-bit Windows 7 SP1 and a Linux proof-of-concept exploit. Specifically, we transform publicly available ROP attacks against Adobe PDF reader [26] and the GNU mediaplayer mPlayer [10]. We used the gadget set derived in §4 to perform the transformation. Furthermore, our attacks are executed with the Call, SimExecFlow, StackPivot, LoadLib, and MemProt option for ROP detection in Microsoft EMET 4.1 enabled. The source code for both attacks is given in our technical report [19].

#### 5.1 Windows Exploits

The Adobe PDF attack used in this paper exploits the integer vulnerability CVE-2010-0188 in the TIFF image processing library libtiff. The vulnerability originally targeted Adobe PDF versions 9.1-9.3 running on Windows XP SP2/SP3. Likewise, the mPlayer attack ex-
exploited a buffer overflow vulnerability that allows the adversary to overwrite an exception handler pointer. Since we perform our analyses on Windows 7, we ported both exploits from Windows XP to Windows 7.

**Exploit Requirements:** For both exploits, we need to (1) allocate a new read-write-execute (RWX) memory page with `VirtualAlloc()`, (2) copy malicious shellcode into the newly allocated page by using `memcpy()`, and (3) redirect the control-flow to the shellcode. Originally, the exploits made use of non-call-preceded gadgets, and used a long chain of short instruction sequences. For mPlayer 18 consecutive short sequences are executed, while for Adobe PDF 11 sequences are executed until the first system call is issued. Hence, both exploits clearly violate \(CFI_{RET}\) and \(CFI_{HEU}\) of the combined CFI policy. These exploits are prevented by Microsoft EMET because of \(CFI_{RET}\), and are detected by both kBouncer and ROPecker due to violation of the \(CFI_{HEU}\) policy.

**Replacing ROP Sequences:** A simplified view of the gadget chain we use for our hardened exploits in the PDF exploit is shown in Figure 5. We first replaced all non-call-preceded sequences with one of our call-preceded sequences in our gadget set identified in Section 4. Both exploits mainly use load register and memory gadgets to set the arguments for our ROP gadget to invoke both functions. By leveraging only call-preceded sequences, we are allowed to leverage indirect calls to invoke these functions (addressing \(CFI_{CALL}\)). Note that even if these were not the case, we could still call these functions by overwriting valid code pointer locations. A demonstration of this weakness — particularly for the approach of Zhang and Sekar [46] — is provided in Section 5.2. Lastly, we need to tackle the CFI policies for behavioral heuristics (addressing \(CFI_{HEU}\)) by ensuring that we never execute more than 7 short sequences in a row before calling our long-NOP gadget.

**Putting-It-All-Together:** Gadget 1 in Figure 5 loads the target address of `VirtualAlloc()` into \(esi\). The arguments to this function (\(Arg1-Arg4\)) are set on the stack. They are chosen in such a way that `VirtualAlloc()` allocates a new RWX memory page. Gadget 2 leverages our Call-Ret-Pair gadget to call `VirtualAlloc()`. The start address of the page is placed by `VirtualAlloc()` into \(eax\).

ROP Gadgets 3 and 4 facilitate two goals: first they store the start address of the new RWX page on the stack. Second, they prepare the execution of the long-NOP gadget. In particular, they set \(esi\) and \(edi\) to `DATA_ADDR`. This address points to an arbitrary data section of one of the linked libraries. Our long-NOP sequence (ROP Gadget 3) will later perform 13 memory writes on this data region, thereafter setting \(esi\) to the start address of `memcpy()`. ROP Gadget 5 invokes `memcpy()` to copy the malicious shellcode onto the newly allocated RWX page. Lastly, our ROP chain transfers the control-flow to the copied shellcode via Gadget 6, which in both exploits opens the Windows calculator.

For the Adobe PDF attack, we used 7 ROP sequences with 52 instructions executed. In the hardened version of the mPlayer exploit, we used 49 ROP sequences with 380 instructions executed. Note that the 49 sequences include the interspersed long-NOP sequences to adhere to the CFI policy \(CFI_{HEU}\). We used a writable memory area of 36 Bytes for the long-NOP gadget. The requirement of more sequences for the mPlayer attack can be attributed to the fact that this exploit did not allow for the use of any NULL bytes in the payload and so we needed to leverage a NULL-Byte gadget (Appendix A) in this exploit. The mPlayer exploit also required a stack pivot gadget (Appendix B). This attack also required a specific stack pivot gadget adding a large constant to \(esp\). Unfortunately, our stack pivot sequences in `kernel32.dll` did not use large enough constants, and the original sequence exploited a non-call-preceded one in `avformat-52.dll`. However, we identified another useful call-preceded stack pivot sequence in the same library which allowed us to instantiate the exploit.

The above strategies can be used to easily transform other ROP attacks to bypass current coarse-grained CFI defenses. Furthermore, given our routines for finding and filtering useful call-preceded ROP sequences, the process

![Figure 5: Simplified view of our hardened PDF exploit. See [19] for the full source code.](image)
of transforming exploits could be fully automated. We leave that as an exercise for future work.

A final remark concerns the control transfer to the injected shellcode. In both exploits, we invoke a call-preceded sequence terminating in an indirect jump. While this approach works for kBouncer, ROPecker, and ROPGuard, it might raise an alarm for CFI for COTS binaries if the shellcode is placed at an address that is not within the set of valid function pointers (i.e., indirect jump targets). However, there are several ways to tackle this issue. A very effective approach has been shown by Göktaş et al. [22], where the code section is simply set to be writable, the shellcode copied to an address which resembles a valid function pointer, and after which the code section is reset back to be executable. Alternatively, one can overwrite the location of a valid function pointer with the start address of the shellcode. We provide a detailed example how this can be realized in the next subsection.

5.2 Linux Shellcode Exploit

Since the approach of Zhang and Sekar [46] targets Linux specifically, we also developed a proof-of-concept exploit that shows how our attack bypasses the CFI policies for indirect calls. To do so, we use a sample program that suffers from a buffer overflow vulnerability allowing an adversary to overwrite a return address on the stack. The goal of our attack is to call execve(), which is a standard system function defined in libc.so to execute a new program. The challenge, however, is that the example program does not include execve(), which is a standard system function defined in libc.so to execute a new program. The first two are programmed in C, while the latter in C++. We developed an Intel Pintool that counts the number of instructions issued between two indirect branches, and the number of consecutive short instruction sequences. Whenever a function call occurs, we check how many short sequences \( s \) have been executed since the last function call.

To overcome this restriction, we make use of an old (but seemingly forgotten) attack technique called global offset table (GOT) overwrite [9]. The basic idea is to write the address of execve() at a valid code pointer location. A well-known location for doing so is the GOT table, which contains pointers to library calls such as printf(). We reiterate that the weakness here is that CFI for COTS binaries does not validate the integrity of these pointers — a very difficult, if not unsurmountable task, in the current design of Linux since the GOT is initialized at runtime of an application. Hence, we can invoke gadgets to overwrite the pointers placed in the GOT. Specifically, we first find useful sequences from the Linux standard library libc.so and use gadgets that perform the GOT overwrite while using only call-preceded sequences.

**Putting-It-All-Together:** An example on how we bypass the CFI policy for indirect calls is shown in Figure 6. The approach is as follows: first, Gadget 1 loads the address of the GOT entry we want to modify into edx, and loads eax with the address of execve(). Next, Gadget 2 overwrites the address of printf() with the address of execve() in the GOT. Finally, Gadget 3 loads the address of the printf() stub into eax, and Gadget 4 uses a Call-Ret-Pair gadget to invoke execve(). At this point, the attack succeeds without violating any of the CFI policies.

### 5.3 On Parameter Adjustment

As alluded to in §3.3, adjusting the parameters for the CFI policy beyond the recommended settings will negatively impact the false positive rate. To assess that, we extended the analysis beyond what Pappas et al. [31] originally performed in order to analyze the impact of increasing \( n \) to 30 or 40 instructions — thereby rendering our Long-NOP gadget (which is only 23 instructions long) stitching ineffective. Specifically, we performed an experiment using three benchmarks of the SPEC CPU 2006 benchmark suite: bzip2, perlbench, and xalancbmk. The first two are programmed in C, while the latter in C++. We developed an Intel Pintool that counts the number of instructions issued between two indirect branches, and the number of consecutive short instruction sequences. Whenever a function call occurs, we check how many short sequences \( s \) have been executed since the last function call.

As Figure 7 shows, increasing the thresholds for \( n \) induces many potential false positives (y-axis). In particular, for each benchmark (x-axis), observe that for \( s > 10 \) there are about 20,000 potential false positives, i.e., 20,000 times we detected a function call that was preceded by more than 10 short sequences.
6 Related Work
Concurrent and independent to our work, several research groups have investigated the security of coarse-grained CFI solutions \([11, 22–24, 34]\). However, our analysis differs from these works as we examine the security of a combination of coarse-grained CFI policies irrespective of when the CFI check occurs. For instance, the attacks shown in \([11, 22, 34]\) are prevented by our combined CFI policy which monitors the sequence length at any time in program execution. Furthermore, unlike these works, we systematically show the construction of a Turing-complete gadget set based on a weak adversary that has only access to one standard shared Windows library. On the other hand, concurrent work also investigates some other interesting attack aspects: Göktas et al. \([22]\) demonstrate attacks against CCFIR \([45]\) using call-preceded gadgets to invoke sensitive functions via direct calls; Carlini and Wagner \([11]\) and Schuster et al. \([34]\) show flushing attacks that eliminate return-oriented programming traces before a critical function is invoked.

Lastly, new CFI-based solutions have also been proposed. For instance, the approaches of Tice et al. \([40]\) and Jang et al. \([25]\) focus on protecting indirect calls to virtual methods in C++. Both approaches have been implemented as a compiler extension and ensure that an adversary cannot manipulate a virtual table (vtable) pointer so that it points to an adversary-controlled (malicious) vtable. Unfortunately, these schemes do not protect against classical ROP attacks which exploit return instructions, and map malicious code to a memory area reserved for a valid virtual method.

7 Summary
Without question, control-flow integrity offers a strong defense against runtime attacks. Its promise lies in the fact that it provides a general defense mechanism to thwart such attacks. Rather than focusing on patching program vulnerabilities one by one, CFI’s power stems from focusing on the integrity of the program’s control flow regardless of how many bugs and errors it may suffer from. Unfortunately, several pragmatic issues (most notably, its relatively high performance overhead), have limited its widespread adoption.

To better tackle the performance trade-off between security and performance, several coarse-grained CFI solutions have been proposed to date \([13, 20, 31, 45, 46]\). Additionally, it has been recently shown that such coarse-grained CFI policies can be applied to operating system kernels \([16]\). These proposals all use relaxed policies, e.g., allowing returns to target any instruction following a call instruction.

While many advancements have been made along the way, all too often the relaxed enforcement policies significantly diminish the security afforded by Abadi et al. \([3]\)’s seminal work. This realization is a bit troubling, and calls for a broader acceptance that we should not sacrifice security for small performance gains. Doing so simply does not raise the bar high enough to deter skillful adversaries. Indeed, our own work shows that even if coarse-grained CFI solutions are combined, there is still enough leeway to mount reasonable and Turing-complete ROP attacks. Our hope is that our findings will raise better awareness of some of the critical issues when designing robust CFI mechanisms, all-the-while re-energizing the community to explore more efficient solutions for empowering CFI.

8 Acknowledgments
We thank Kevin Z. Snow and Úlfar Erlingsson for their valuable feedback on earlier versions of this paper.

References


\[10\] C4SS’0 and h1ch4m. MPlayer Lite r33064 m3u Buffer Overflow Exploit (DEP Bypass). http://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/17565/, 2011.


A  NULL-Byte Write Gadget

In real-world exploits it is useful to have gadgets that allow one to conveniently write a NULL word to memory. This is important as real-world vulnerabilities typically do not allow an adversary to write a NULL byte in the payload, but such functionality is indeed needed to write a 32-bit NULL word on the stack when required as a parameter to function calls.

A prominent example is the traditional `strcpy(dest,src)` vulnerability, which can be exploited to write data beyond the boundaries of the `src` variable. However, `strcpy()` stops copying input data after encountering a NULL byte.

Our choice for such a gadget is shown in Figure 8. This gadget first loads the target address into `ebp` with the first ROP sequence. The next sequence exploits the `and` instruction to generate a NULL word at the memory location pointed to by `ebp-20h`.

B  Stack Pivot Gadgets

We take advantage of two distinct stack pivot gadgets shown in Table 8. The first one is our unconditional branch gadget, which moves `ebp` via the `leave` instruction to `esp`. The other sequence takes the value of `esi` and loads it into `esp`. In both sequences, the adversary must control the source register `ebp` and `esi`, respectively. This is achieved by invoking a load register gadget beforehand. Note also that several vulnerabilities allow an adversary to load these registers with the correct values at the time the buffer overflow occurs, which would make the ROP attack easier.

C  Details of Long-NOP Gadget

Listing 1: Pre-Seuence for LNOP

```
pop esi ; ptr to writable mem for NOP
pop edi ; ptr to writable mem for NOP
pop ebp ; unused in NOP
retn 8 ; -> insert 8 bytes junk after next gadget
```

Listing 2: Long sequence used for LNOP gadget

```
movzx eax , ax
mov [esi+4] , eax ; 5 writes to memory
mov [esi+8] , 1f4bh ; a 20 byte memory region
mov [esi+14h] , 5 ; memory region
mov [esi+10h] , 1fh
mov [esi+0Ch] , 0ch
push 38h
pop eax
mov [esi+1Ch] , eax ; 2 writes to mem
mov [esi+20h] , eax ; 8 byte region
xor eax , eax
mov [esi+18h] , 17h ; another 8 bytes
mov [esi+24h] , 98967fh
mov [edi+18h] , eax ; if edi == esi
mov [edi+1Ch] , eax ; these writes
mov [edi+20h] , eax ; goto the same
mov [edi+24h] , eax ; region as before
pop edi ; (optional:) restore edi
pop esi ; (optional:) restore esi
mov eax , ebx
pop ebx ; (optional:) load former eax
pop ebp
retn 0ch
```

Notes

1. Some of the mechanisms used in kBouncer and ROPGuard (both awarded by Microsoft’s BlueHat Prize [39]) have already been integrated in Microsoft’s defense tool called EMET [29].
2. Sequences that end in indirect jumps or calls can also be used [12].
3. Typically, CFI does not validate direct branches because these addresses are hard-coded in the code of an executable and cannot be changed by an adversary when W⊕X is enforced.
4. Specifically, kBouncer reports a ROP attack when a chain of 8 short sequences has been executed, where a sequence is referred to as “short” whenever the sequence length is less than 20 instructions.
5. The target address of an external function is dynamically allocated in the global offset table (GOT) which is loaded by an indirect memory jump in the procedure linkage table (PLT).
6. For the interested reader, we have placed the specific assembler implementation of the long-NOP sequence in Appendix C.
7. We also simulated the analysis performed in [31] by setting \( n = 20 \). However, we arrive at a significantly higher false positive rate than in [31]. This is likely due to the fact that we perform our analysis on industry benchmark programs, while their analysis is based on opening web-browsers or document readers. Furthermore, their focus is on WinAPI calls, whereas in Figure 7 we instrument every call.