A fundamental prerequisite for the development of society and the economy is that the actors and processes of present and future IT infrastructures can justifiably trust each other. Cryptography is an essential enabler of such trust, supporting important protection goals such as confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation.
P3 – Hardware-Entangled Cryptography
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are a promising approach to realize minimal trust anchors for embedded devices. This project will design novel PUF-based security primitives. On top of this, it will build efficient and scalable PUF-based device identification and authentication schemes providing intrinsic protection against basic hardware attacks. The project will develop a formal security framework to analyze the security of the developed solutions according to modern cryptographic standards.
For more information please visit the CROSSING P3 page of our research team.
S2 – Attestation Protocols
The goal of this project area is to provide cryptography-based security solutions that match all the necessary functional requirements to establish trust in new and next generation computing environments. Such solutions have been and will be indispensable to establish trust in the identities and properties of actors, in the soundness of their devices, and in the proper functioning and privacy-friendliness of services.
Embedded and mobile systems are more and more used in security- and safety-critical applications. This generates an increasing need for enabling technologies to validate and verify the integrity of a system's software state against malicious code. This project will design and develop novel attestation schemes that allow to validate and verify the software integrity and trustworthiness of remote devices, cover runtime attacks, do not require complex and/or costly security hardware, are secure in stronger adversary models than existing approaches, and that do not solely rely on standard cryptographic techniques.
For more information please visit the CROSSING S2 page of our research team.