New Paper published: Secure Message Authentication in the Presence of Leakage and Faults

by Francesco Berti, Ramat Gan, Chun Guo, Thomas Peters, Yaobin Shen, François-Xavier Standaert


Security against side-channels and faults is a must for the deployment of embedded cryptography. A wide body of research has investigated solutions to secure implementations against these attacks at different abstraction levels. Yet, to a large extent, current solutions focus on one or the other threat. In this paper, we initiate a mode-level study of cryptographic primitives that can ensure security in a (new and practically-motivated) adversarial model combining leakage and faults. Our goal is to identify constructions that do not require a uniform protection of all their operations against both attack vectors. For this purpose, we first introduce a versatile and intuitive model to capture leakage and faults. We then show that a MAC from Asiacrypt 2021 natively enables a leveled implementation for fault resilience where only its underlying tweakable block cipher must be protected, if only the tag verification can be faulted. We finally describe two approaches to amplify security for fault resilience when also the tag generation can be faulted. One is based on iteration and requires the adversary to inject increasingly large faults to succeed. The other is based on randomness and allows provable security against differential faults.


This work has been funded in parts by the ERC project SWORD (724725), the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research, and the Hessen State Ministry for Higher Education, Research and the Arts within their joint support of the National Research Center for AppliedCybersecurity ATHENE